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FORMULAS OF REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENT 
UNITS IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF FEDERAL STATES
One of the characteristics of the federal system which distinguishes it as a form of organisation of government is the participation of the entities of the fe-
deration in wielding federal power, which is made possible above all by their re-
presentation in the structure of federal bodies.1 This representation is inscribed in 
the wider principle of participation (shared rule), which is shown to be one of two 
principles, alongside autonomy (self rule), of the federal system.2 An element of 
the principle of shared rule is also the special procedure of change of a constitutio-
nal system, which requires the involvement of the objects of the federation, while 
an equally important role is played by the structure of state bodies of the federa-
tion, thanks to which participation of the constituent units in the federal decision 
process becomes possible. Of particular importance here is the separate represen-
tation of the territorial communities forming the federation in the federal parlia-
ment, which is supposed to guarantee them a role in the creation of federal law and 
permit the articulation of interests at a nationwide legislative forum. Characteristic 
of federalism is the principle of double representation. “In federations ‘the people’ 
is treated as one being in a sense, and as a number of beings in another. The pe-
ople is represented as a whole (nation) and as [individual] parts (separate regions 
forming the nation).”3
1 Cf. J. Smith, Federalism, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver 2004, p. 15.
2 See D.J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa 1987, p. 12; 
M. Burgess, ‘Federalism and Federation: A Reappraisal’ in M. Burgess, A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), 
Comparative Federalism and Federation, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York 1993, p. 5; E. Zwierz-
chowski, Wprowadzenie do nauki prawa konstytucyjnego państw demokratycznych, Katowice 1992, 
p. 63.
3 P. King, ‘Federation and Representation’ in M. Burgess, A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), Comparative 
Federalism…, p. 96.
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It is generally accepted that the principle of double representation enforces the 
acceptance by parliaments of federal states of a bicameral structure, in which the 
second chamber is supposed to guarantee representation to the constituent units. 
This view is sometimes accepted so uncritically that authors claim that “the exist-
ence of a second chamber in a federal state is practically inarguable,” that it is “supra-
systemic,” or that “it is obvious and has an undoubted pandemic value.”4 The fact 
that the majority of federal states do have bicameral parliaments and that one of the 
results, if not the decisive one, of their acceptance of bicameralism was to enable the 
representation of the constituent units, should not in itself lead to the acceptance 
that “bicameralism has transformed par excellence into a structural characteristic of 
federalism itself.”5 The structural characteristics of federalism, to keep to that termi-
nology, are not a bicameral system, but a separate representation of units of the fed-
eration in the federal parliament. This can also be realised successfully in the condi-
tions of a unicameral legislature.6 It is not hard to imagine practical solutions which 
could serve to show that federations in which only one chamber operates can also 
be effective.
In the Comoros Federation, which, nota bene, constitutes an example of rejec-
tion of a bicameral system in favour of unicameralism,7 the unicameral parliament, 
the Union Assembly (L’Assemblée de l’Union) is made up of 18 members elected by 
general and direct elections and by 15 chosen in equal proportions (5 each) by the 
parliamentary assemblies of the three units of the federation. The constitution of 
Micronesia, too, designates two categories of members of the Congress: those elect-
ed in single-mandate districts for a two-year term, so-called “general” members, and 
deputies elected on the basis of state equality (art. 20), for whom the electoral district 
is the whole state, and whose term lasts four years. Moreover, in the second read-
ing, which is decisive for the adoption of legislation, the members of Congress do 
not vote individually, but as part of state delegations (comprising both categories of 
4 J. Szymanek, Druga izba we współczesnym parlamencie. Analiza porównawcza na przykładzie europej-
skich państw unitarnych, Warszawa 2005, p. 25.
5 Ibid., p. 26.
6 Preston King is one of few writers on this subject to very much emphasise this. See P. King, Federalism 
and Federation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1982, pp. 94-95, 140. Unicameral 
parliaments in federal states are also discussed by Thomas Fleiner-Gester. See T. Fleiner-Gester, 
‘Federalism in Australia and in Other Nations’ in G. Craven (ed.), Australian Federation. Towards 
the Second Century, Melbourne University Press, Carlton (Vic.) 1992, p. 24.
7 Until 1999 the parliament of the Comoros Federation comprised two chambers: The Federal 
Assembly and the Senate, in which each of the federal entities was represented by 5 members. The 
new constitution of 2001 scrapped the bicameral parliament in favour of a unicameral Assembly 
of the Union. It is therefore not necessarily the case, as Eugeniusz Zwierzchowski writes, that “in 
federal state structures these chambers [i.e. second] constitute such a significant element of the 
political system that to question the sense of their existence is connected with negation of the ex-
isting territorial structure of the state, which generally means postulating converting the previous 
system into its opposite”. E. Zwierzchowski, ‘Prawnoustrojowa ewolucja drugich izb w państwach 
europejskich (próba syntezy)’ in E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie parlamentu, Białystok 1996, 
p. 14.
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members from each of the states), while a majority of two-thirds of the delegation is 
required for the law to be passed.
We can say, then, that under a system with a unicameral parliament the separate 
representation of units of the federation can be guaranteed above all by introduc-
tion of various categories of members, elected in various ways or for terms of varying 
lengths. Parliamentary procedures related to the realisation of legislative functions 
can also provide an effective guarantee of the results of the constituent units for the 
work of a unicameral federal legislature.
A further solution can be to allow the units of the federation the right to deter-
mine the formula for the structure of parliament. This type of regulation is included 
in the constitution of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (art. 69). In this case it is 
the authorities of the constituent units (emirates) that determine to what extent, 
based on its make-up, the parliament – the National Federal Council (Majlis Watani 
Itihad) – will represent them. The only restriction introduced by the constitution 
is the prohibition of imperative mandates, resulting from art. 77.8 For many years 
the members of the parliament of UAE were nominated by emirs, i.e. the heads of 
the executive of the units of the federation. In 2006, for the first time half of the 40 
members of parliament were elected as a result of direct elections.9
Among the countries considered federal, unicameral parliaments also exist in 
Venezuela and St. Kitts and Nevis. In both cases there is no separate representa-
tion of the units of the federation in their structure. The constitution of Venezuela 
abandoned bicameralism in 1999, while the only reference to representation of 
the states in parliament can be found in art. 201, according to which members of 
parliament should be representatives of the people (pueblo) as well as the state in 
which they are elected. It is hard to see this as a satisfactory solution. There is no 
such reference in the constitution of St. Kitts and Nevis. This lack of appropri-
ate regulation guaranteeing separate representation to the units of the federation 
certainly allows a question mark to be placed over the federal character of the sys-
tem, especially in the case of the former country. In the case of the federation of 
St. Kitts and Nevis the matter is not as clear, since this is a small federation, con-
sisting of only two units, meaning that even a lack of appropriate constitutional 
regulations does not have to disqualify the parliament of the country from being 
a federal legislature, i.e. also representing the interests of the constituent parts of 
the federation.10
8 Art. 77 states that a member of parliament should represent the whole federation, and not just the 
emirate of which he is a representative.
9 The changes constitute the first stage of reform of the parliament; the next stages plan an increase 
in the number of members and introduction of free and direct elections of half of them. When this 
happens, the UAE parliament will join the ranks of unicameral federal legislatures in which mem-
bers are distinguished by the way in which they were voted in.
10 Two categories of members comprise the unicameral parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis: representa-
tives, elected in general elections, and senators, appointed by the Governor General, of whom one 
third are nominated by the leader of the opposition, and the remaining two thirds by the premier. 
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Bicameralism is not, then, a precondition of a federal system. The separate repre-
sentation of constituent parts can be guaranteed with success in a unicameral parlia-
ment too. It is probably not a coincidence that this type of solution can most often 
be found in federations which are rather small in terms of territory and size of popu-
lation. In conditions of small statedom bicameralism is a much less rational solution 
than in federations of extensive territory, created by many entities.
Most frequently, however, federalism is associated with a bicameral legislature, 
in which one of the chambers ensures representation of the constituent parts in the 
federal parliament.11 This is the simplest, and therefore also most popular method of 
guaranteeing them a separate representation. There are second chambers functioning 
in 18 of the 23 states generally considered to be federal. This structure of legislature 
was adopted in the first federation in history – the United States of America – and 
then in a series of others. Federalism gives a natural justification for bicameralism; in 
other words it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a second chamber, which 
legitimises its presence in the political system of a state. Federalism established an 
entirely new rationalisation for bicameral parliaments,12 and without a doubt federal 
systems constitute a particularly favourable environment for bicameralism.13 As a re-
sult, discussion about bicameralism as a rational form of parliamentary structure in 
a federal state in fact loses its raison d’être: “one can maintain that the general issues 
of bicameralism do not matter in a federal state, since the second chamber exercises 
functions that are specific to a federation.”14
Unlike in the Comoros Federation and Micronesia, though, they are not fixed as representatives 
of the constituent units, as shown by the fact that the constitution does not designate the propor-
tions in which the two islands must be represented by senators. However, it happens that spe-
cific senators are appointed owing to geographical factors. See A.L. Griffiths, ‘St. Kitts and Nevis’ 
in A.L. Griffiths (ed.), Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal 2002, p. 273.
11 It is important to remember that, with federal bicameralism, even in the systemic construction of 
the first chamber solutions can be found which take into account the federal character of the sys-
tem. The rule is that each entity of the federation has at least one seat in the first chamber guar-
anteed, irrespective of the size of the population, or, as in Australia, a minimum of five seats. An 
alternative solution is the correlation of borders of electoral districts with those of the federated 
units (art. 149 sec. 3 of the constitution of Switzerland) or requirement of domicile for candidates 
to the first chamber, which emphasises their connection to the state or province from which they 
are elected (in Mexico and Argentina candidates to the Chamber of Deputies must fulfil the same 
conditions in terms of domicile as candidates for senator – art. 55 of the constitution of Mexico and 
art. 45 of the constitution of Argentina).
12 D. Shell, ‘The History of Bicameralism’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), p. 12.
13 S.C. Patterson, A. Mughan, ‘Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism’ in S.C. Patterson, A. Mughan 
(eds.), Senates. Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, Ohio State University Press, Columbus 
1999, p. 10.
14 F. Koja, ‘Rada Federalna w Austrii’ in K. Działocha et al. (eds.), Konstytucja w społeczeństwie 
obywatelskim. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Prof. Witolda Zakrzewskiego, Kraków 1989, p. 104. 
Similar: J. Czajowski, ‘Dwuizbowa struktura parlamentu w państwie jednolitym’ in J. Czajowski, 
M. Grzybowski (eds.), Parlamenty państw europejskich, Kraków 2005, p. 167.
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When it comes to describing the formula of representation of constituent units 
of the federation in the second chamber, the following factors will be of decisive sig-
nificance: the composition or division of seats between the constituent entities; the 
means by which the second chamber is constructed, where of significance is who 
(the federation or the entities) decides on the regulation of this material, and to what 
extent; the character of the representative mandate of the members sitting in the sec-
ond chamber of parliament.
In terms of the composition, of prime importance is acceptance or rejection of 
the principle of equal representation of all entities of the federation. Of course, this 
principle was ultimately accepted by the American constitutional convention, al-
though this was an issue that caused a great deal of disagreement and controversies 
during deliberations. Equal representation of all constituent parts is not a require-
ment of a federal system. This formula of distribution of seats in the second chamber 
of parliament is often known, though, as the classical type, as it was adopted not only 
by the American federation, which was the first in history, but also among the other 
earliest examples of the form: in Switzerland and Australia.
Out of the contemporary federal states which have a second chamber of parlia-
ment, equal representation of the constituent parts is present in its pure form in 
eight.15 In two more (Malaysia, Mexico) the states are also represented in senates by 
an equal number of representatives, whereby in these states part of the second cham-
ber is composed of senators elected in a different way, i.e. not on a territorial basis.16 
It appears, however, that in these cases too we can talk of equal representation of the 
entities of the federation, albeit weakened by the presence of deputies elected by use 
of a different formula. We can therefore conclude that the principle of equal repre-
sentation of constituent parts is present in 10 of the 18 federal second chambers, of 
which exist a flawed form. This means that this principle is still the dominant for-
mula for the division of seats between constituent parts in the second chamber of 
a federal parliament, although this domination is not significant.17
The equality of the constituent parts in a body meant to constitute their repre-
sentation in a federal legislature shows and emphasises their status as equal partners 
15 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, USA. Traditionally, the Swiss 
cantons also had equal representation in the Council of States. However, the constitution of 1999 
abolished the previous half-cantons, raising their status to that of canton. At the same time, though, 
by not providing previous half-cantons with two seats in the Council (they still have the right to 
one representative), it introduced a distinction between cantons in terms of their representation in 
the second chamber. Based on the current constitution 20 cantons have the right to two seats in the 
Council of States, and six to one seat (art. 150 sec. 1 and 2).
16 In Malaysia, 44 of the current 70 senators are nominated by the head of state (Yang Di-Pertuan 
Agong) on the recommendation of the premier, and 13 states are represented by two senators each. 
In Mexico each state elects three senators, a further three come from the federal district and 32 are 
elected by a proportional system, with the whole country being one electoral district.
17 To the ten federations named we should add a further two, in which the entities of the federation 
are represented in an equal number but by a unicameral parliament. This would therefore give a to-
tal of 12 federal states employing the principle of equal representation of the constituent units.
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within the federation.18 Some constitutions, e.g. those of the USA and Australia, 
guarantee each state an inviolable right to representation equal to the other states in 
the Senate without its consent, in this way understanding the regulation on equal 
representation in the Senate as a particular procedure of change. It is important to 
stress that the determining factor in equal distribution of seats might be efforts to 
equalise all the entities of the federation not only with regard to the differences be-
tween them in the context of population, but also, for example, in terms of the level 
of economic development.19 The principle of equality of the entities of a federation 
in federal legislature can also be displayed in parliamentary procedure. Art. 23 of 
the constitution of Australia does not permit the chair of the Senate to cast an ad-
ditional or deciding vote in the case of a tie in votes. The justification for this is 
the requirement of equal representation of states in the Senate. This is because if 
the chair of the Senate could cast an additional vote, or if his vote were to decide 
on a result in the case of an undecided vote, then one state would have one of its 
senators operating as chair or with an additional vote (and therefore the state would 
have more votes than the remaining states), or would be able to settle issues in the 
case of a split vote.20
In cases where there is no principle of equality in operation, the division of seats 
is also not based on the proportional formula. It cannot be, since the effect of use 
of this formula would be to duplicate the composition of the first chamber. For this 
reason too the weighted system is used, in which by stipulating the number of seats 
to which each of the entities of the federation is entitled, the demographic aspect 
is considered, while introducing generally far-reaching modifications. The closest 
to proportionality is the model employed in the constitution of India, according 
to which the size of the state representations in the second chamber of the parlia-
ment (Rajya Sabha) is between one and 34, although the population ratio between 
the largest state and the smallest, entitled to one seat, is larger than 34:1. In Austria, 
though, the most populous land is entitled to 12 seats in the Federal Council, while 
the others are given as many as results from the ratio of their population to the popu-
lation of the land with the greatest population, although each land has a guaranteed 
three seats, irrespective of whether it is entitled to this number under the aforemen-
tioned formula. The formula of distribution of votes between Länder in the German 
18 Cf. N. Aroney, ‘Federal Representation and the Framers of the Australian Constitution’ in 
G.A. Moens (ed.), Constitutional and International Law Perspectives, University of Queensland 
Press, St. Lucia 2000, p. 18. In Australia the constitutional guarantee of equal representation of 
the states in the Senate only covers the founder states, i.e. those which joined the federation on 
January 1, 1901. A newly admitted state can also receive an equal number of seats in the Senate 
to others, but this is dependent on the decision of the federal parliament. Note that this number 
is not necessarily lower than the number of seats guaranteed to the founder states – it can also be 
greater.
19 See A. Żukowski, Parlament Republiki Południowej Afryki, Warszawa 2002, p. 15.
20 H. Evans (ed.), Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, Department of the Senate, Canberra 2004, 
p. 219.
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Bundesrat is well known.21 Also worthy of note is the solution adopted in Canada, 
where in distribution of seats in the Senate is based on a principle of equality not of 
provinces, but of the four regions, into which the country is divided for the purposes 
of filling senate mandates. Because two provinces are also regions, and each of the 
other regions comprises four provinces, there is no concept of equality in this con-
text.22 The smallest province has the right to four seats, and the largest to 24, but the 
ratio of population between them is far in excess of 6:1.
Adoption of a balanced system can be seen as the expression of a compromise 
between the principle of equal treatment of entities of a federation and that of guar-
anteed representation corresponding to the population of each one.23 It can also be 
the result of the need for special treatment of one of the constituent parts, as a re-
sult, for instance, of its ethnic and cultural separateness, as was the case in Quebec 
in Canada.24
Even when the demographic factor is considered in the composition of the sec-
ond chamber, this principle continues to mean over-representation of smaller con-
stituent parts.25 Larger entities do indeed receive more seats in the second chamber, 
but not to an extent that they can dominate the composition in the way they might 
in the first chamber, and in fact dominate the decision-making process at the federal 
level26. This constitutes the most visible expression of compromise between the larger 
and smaller entities of the federation, seeming to lie at the base of every federal state. 
As K.C. Wheare writes, in federal states the dominant view is that “regional differ-
ences are so important that a safeguard needs to be included in the legislative proc-
ess thanks to which less populated parts of the country are given by the legislature 
greater influences than they would deserve on the basis of population.”27
21 Art. 51 sec. 1 of the Basic Law (1990) guarantees each Land at least three votes in the Federal 
Council. Länder with a population of over 2 million people have the right to four votes, those of 
over 6 million to five and over 7 million to six.
22 After Newfoundland joined the Canadian Federation in 1949 the equality of the regions was also 
upset since, as a new province (as of 2001 named Newfoundland and Labrador), it became a part 
of one of the regions which in this situation has more seats in the Senate than all the rest.
23 In reference to Austria: R. Thienel, ‘Austriacki parlament federalny: organizacja i kompetencje’, 
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji, Vol. 34 (1996), p. 20.
24 “The Founding Fathers of the Confederation decided not to accept the principle of equal repre-
sentation of individual provinces in the Senate owing to the special situation of Canada, in which 
one of the biggest and most populous provinces was inhabited by a cultural and linguistic minority 
in the country. Awarding the same number of senators to Quebec as to other, less populous prov-
inces without large minority groups would deny this province the opportunity to effectively express 
the opinions of the Francophone populations.” K. Complak, Parlament Kanady, Warszawa 1999, 
p. 216.
25 See M. Russell, ‘The Territorial Role of Second Chambers’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 1 (2001), p. 107.
26 See T.O. Hueglin, A. Fenna, Comparative Federalism. A Systematic Inquiry, Broadview Press, 
Peterborough–Orchard Park 2006, p. 181.
27 K.C. Wheare, Legislative Bodies, Bicentennial Publishing, New York 1993, p. 173.
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Increasing the value of smaller parts of the federation at the cost of larger ones 
does mean, however, denial of the principle of equal representation of citizens, which 
constitutes the essence of democratic representation. The disproportions between the 
citizens of the various constituent parts are seen most vividly in places which employ 
the principle of equality of entities of the federation. California and Wyoming are 
each represented in the US Senate by two senators, even though the population ra-
tio between the two states is around 66:1. In Australia the analogous ratio between 
New South Wales and Tasmania is 14:1, whereas the residents of each state elect 12 
senators. A similar phenomenon can be found too in conditions where the balanced 
model is used. As an example, in the Federal Republic of Germany the representative 
norm in the Federal Council is 2.88 and 1.88 million for the most populous Länder, 
and 0.22 and 0.36 million for the least populous28. The balanced system constitutes 
an attempt to unify principles that are essentially difficult to unify, of equality of citi-
zens and equality of constituent parts. However, as these principles are conflicting, 
the system fails to deliver an entirely satisfactory solution in this matter. Characteristic 
of federal systems, therefore, is sacrifice, at least to a certain degree, of equality of all 
citizens in favour of guarantee, again at least to a certain degree, of equality of the ter-
ritorial communities which make up the federation. It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that this is a vital concession, which serves the overriding goal that is main-
tenance of a stable union of differing entities, something which must, for various rea-
sons, lie in the interest of all.29
The second chambers of seven federations are derived from general and direct 
elections,30 in five, the choice is made by representative bodies of the constituent parts,31 
in Germany the Bundesrat is composed of members of state parliaments, which appoint 
and dismiss them, while in Canada it is the Governor General who nominates senators 
on the recommendation of the premier (meaning that the head of the federal govern-
ment decides on the composition of the Senate). In four federal countries various types 
of mixed system operate. In Malaysia some of the members of the Senate (currently 44) 
are nominated by the head of state on the recommendation of the federal premier, while 
the remaining 26 are elected by state parliaments (two each). From each of the entities of 
the Russian Federation, two members enter the Federal Council, one of whom is elected 
by the legislature and the other by the executive of each of the entities.32 In South Africa, 
28 P. Czarny, Bundesrat. Między niemiecką tradycją a europejską przyszłością, Warszawa 2000, p. 66.
29 Cf. P. King, ‘Federation and Representation’, p. 101.
30 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland, USA.
31 Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan. In the last two countries some of the 
members of the second chambers are appointed in a different way. However, given that they repre-
sent a clear minority in the makeup of the two chambers, we can state that both countries may be 
counted among those federations in which the second chambers are constituted by the parliaments 
of the constituent units.
32 The decree on appointment of a member of the Council by the executive must be confirmed by 
the legislature of the federal entity, and with a 2/3 qualified majority. Until 2000 the heads of the 
legislature and executive of each of the entities were ex officio members of the Council.
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the delegation of a province in the National Council of Provinces, the second chamber 
of the federal parliament, is formed by the premier of the province (or a member of the 
provincial legislature delegated by him), three special delegates elected by the provincial 
legislature from its members, and six permanent delegates, who are also elected by the 
representative body of the province. The way in which the Belgian Senate is composed 
is especially complicated: it has to ensure representation not only of the three regions 
which make up the federation, but also of the three language groups. Just over a half 
of Belgian senators are elected in general elections, some are chosen by the Council of 
the three language communities, and some become members of the second chamber by 
cooption.33
It is clear, therefore, that just as often as they are elected directly by the voters, 
members of the second chamber are elected by the parliaments of the entities of a fed-
eration, either as the only, dominant (Russia, South Africa) or the minor (Belgium, 
Malaysia) actor in this process. Far less frequently do the executives of the entities of 
a federation take part in the composition of the second chamber: in two countries is 
this the case, partly (Malaysia) or wholly (Canada).
General and direct elections seem to be a form of recompense for the deformation 
in terms of equality of citizens resulting from the principle of equal representation of 
constituent parts, although in the United States they were only introduced in 1913 
and in Switzerland the members of the Council of States are elected in this way in all 
cantons since as recently as 1977. In the latter case this results from the fact that the 
right to alter the mode of elections to the second chamber has traditionally been, and 
continues to be the domain of canton law (at present the entitlements of cantons in 
this area are guaranteed by art. 150 sec. 3 of the federal constitution). For this reason, 
for a long time the method of alteration in the various cantons varied, with at first 
in the majority of them parliaments electing the deputies.34 Today, as well, there are 
differences between the cantons in terms of the date of elections, regulations govern-
ing access to passive and active voting rights and the formula used for voting.35 The 
cantons’ legislation also determines the length of terms served by deputies from the 
various cantons, which is at present four years in all of them.
33 The procedure of composition of the Senate is regulated in detail by art. 67 and 68 of the consti-
tution. See also A. Młynarska-Sobaczewska, ‘Prawo wyborcze do parlamentu Królestwa Belgii’ in 
S. Grabowska, K. Składowski (eds.), Prawo wyborcze do parlamentu w wybranych państwach europej-
skich, Zakamycze, Kraków 2006, pp. 97-98; F. Gorlé, ‘Les Assemblées Parlamentaires en Belgique 
selon la constitution du 17 février 1994’ in K. Iwanicka, M. Skowronek, K. Stembrowicz (eds.), 
Parlament, prawo, ludzie. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi Bardachowi w sześćdziesięciolecie 
pracy twórczej, Warszawa 1996, p. 81.
34 J.F. Aubert, ‘Parlament a Zgromadzenie Federalne’ in Parlament Szwajcarii, trans. by B. Banaszak, 
Warszawa 2000, p. 23.
35 At present, a majority system, often the French version, applies in all cantons. In one canton, 
though (Jura), a proportional system is used, and in one the canton assembly (Landsgemeinde), 
i.e. a meeting of all voters of the canton, makes the choice. P. Sarnecki, ‘Prawo wyborcze do par-
lamentu Konfederacji Szwajcarskiej’ in S. Grabowska, K. Składowski (eds.), Prawo wyborcze…, 
pp. 265-266.
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The solution in place in Switzerland is exceptional (as we saw previously, only 
the constitution of the UAE features similar regulations),36 with a rule that the way 
in which the second chamber is composed, like the length of terms of office, is de-
termined in the regulations of the federal constitution. It is worth noting, however, 
that in Ethiopia the constitution entitles the state parliaments to introduce direct 
elections (art. 61 sec. 3), while in Malaysia direct elections can be introduced by the 
federal parliament on its own (art. 45 sec. 4 of the constitution). In the former case 
this is a concession on behalf of the states, and in the latter of course it is the oppo-
site, as it weakens their position. In both countries, however, any other change, other 
than introduction of a general election (e.g. involving returning to the state executive 
the right to form the Senate), requires an alteration of the constitution. In four coun-
tries, though, the length of the term of office is not fixed in the federal constitution 
but matches the term of the parliamentary bodies of the entities of the federation 
selecting the members of the second chamber (Austria, Russia, South Africa – only 
permanent delegates)37 or otherwise is not fixed at all, as in the case of the German 
Bundesrat and the special delegates to the National Council of Provinces in South 
Africa.
These exceptions do not, though, change the general picture, which shows that 
the way in which second chambers are composed is almost always the exclusive do-
main of the federal constitutions. This solution is understandable and in all respects 
rational, as it is the national bodies of the federation that are in question, and this is 
all the more the case as the autonomy of the entities is sufficiently protected, since 
their participation is required to make a change to the constitution.38 It is important 
to emphasise, though, that the solutions in place in Switzerland clearly express and 
stress the status of the Council of States as the chamber which is supposed to repre-
sent the cantons in the federal parliament, in this way raising the status of the prin-
ciple of federalism as one of the key elements of the state system.
The formula for the composition of the second chamber is decisive in the model 
of representation that is realised in it. In the case of direct elections the object of the 
representation of the second chamber of parliament is the residents of the entities 
of the federation. In other models it is most often the bodies of authority of these 
entities, legislative or executive or both depending on the solutions adopted. Within 
a general formula speaking of representation of the constituent units in the federal 
36 An analogous regulation was also in force in the Yugoslav federation founded in 1992. The desig-
nation of the means of constituting the second chamber of the federal parliament, the Chamber 
of the Republic (Vece Republik) was up to the legislative branch of the republics which consti-
tuted the republic. In practice the members of the Chamber were elected by their parliaments. 
See M. Crnobrnja, ‘Yugoslavia’ in A.L. Griffiths (ed.), Handbook of Federal…, p. 378, 383.
37 The term of office of permanent delegates may be shortened as a result of changes in the party 
composition in the provincial legislature during the term. See art. 61 sec. 2 b point Ii of the federal 
constitution.
38 In Austria, regulations on the composition and structure of the Federal Council are fortified by an 
additional special alteration procedure (art. 35 sec. 4). Some of the regulations in force in this area 
in the constitutions of Australia and the USA have already been mentioned.
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parliaments as a requirement of a federal system, then, there is room for many vary-
ing solutions. The choice of which is adopted determines which of the various mod-
els of representation is used.
Although the second chambers of parliament fulfil a range of functions, a partic-
ular role played by the chambers of federal parliaments is to represent the interests of 
the constituent parts of the federation.39 We can even assume that, in a federal state 
and a federal parliamentary system, this function takes centre stage.40 As a result, 
a particular significance is taken on in the linking of members of the second cham-
bers with the territorial communities whose interests they are to represent in the fed-
eral parliament. The form of these links, and how tightly they are fixed, is decisive 
not only in the specific case of the model of the representative mandate, but also for 
the effectiveness of the second chamber in fulfilling its basic function, i.e. represent-
ing the interests of the federated units and acting on behalf of the consideration of 
these interests in the federal legislative process.
The most important indicator of the level of connection between the federal en-
tity and its representation is the way in which the composition of the second cham-
ber is decided. The connection is strongest when the representation of the federal 
entity is shaped by its governmental bodies, or at least with their participation. It is 
no coincidence that this way of forming the composition of second chambers is the 
dominant model in federal states. Direct elections weaken this relationship consider-
ably, and it is of course completely lacking if the members of the second chamber are 
appointed by the federal authorities.
In cases where the members of second chambers are elected by direct elections, 
the authorities of entities of the federation can gain an influence in the composition 
of the second chamber in case of a seat becoming vacated. This form of filling va-
cancies is envisaged in the constitutions of the United States and Australia.41 In the 
former case supplementary elections are called for the state whose seat in the Senate 
is vacated, but the legislature of the state can permit the governor to make a tempo-
rary nomination until such time as the seat is filled by elections. In Australia, in ac-
cordance with art. 15 of the constitution, it is up to the state parliament to fill vacant 
39 In many other unitary states too, the members of the second chamber represent the territorial units 
of the state (France, Spain, Italy) or the composition of the second chamber is made up based on 
territory. None the less, only in a federal system does the role of second chambers as territorial rep-
resentation have such significance for the political system.
40 In the process of creation of most, if not all federal states, the question of representation of the 
constituent parts in the federal legislature has awakened the most emotion. In this area too much 
controversy has ensued, such as the struggle in the US Senate at the time of the Philadelphia 
Convention, which almost caused it to be abandoned. This clearly shows the significance attached 
to representation of federated units in the federal parliament as a guarantee of the defence of their 
interests.
41 Also in the case of the unicameral parliament of Micronesia it is up to the state executive to fill va-
cancies, and only when less than 12 months remain to the end of the term of office. The state ex-
ecutives then have the right to fill all vacant seats, regardless of whether they are those of “normal” 
members of Congress or of those elected by art. 20 of the constitution.
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seats. If the vacancy arises in the recess between sessions, the state governor can make 
a temporary nomination at the request of the state executive.42 In Brazil, on the other 
hand, in order to avoid this kind of situation each senator is elected with two under-
studies, who have the right to take his place should it become vacant.43 Vice-senators 
are also elected in Mexico (art. 57). In Argentina, meanwhile, the constitution orders 
that the executive of the given province immediately call supplementary elections in 
the case of vacation of a seat in the Senate (art. 62).
The majority of federal constitutions do not make reference to the possibility of 
combining a seat in the second chamber of the federal parliament with a position in 
the government of the federal entities. Only in Belgium, Germany, Russia and South 
Africa do the constitutions make a combination of positions in the executive and/
or legislative of the constituent units with seats in the Senate, Bundesrat, Council of 
the Federation and National Council of Provinces compulsory. While in Germany 
and Russia this requirement concerns all members of the Bundesrat and Council of 
the Federation respectively, (art. 51 sec. 3 of the German Basic Law, art. 95 sec. 2 of 
the Russian constitution), in South Africa it applies only to certain of the members 
of the Council – special delegates (art. 61 sec. 4). For the remaining members (per-
manent delegates), meanwhile, the constitution prohibits combination of seats. In 
the case of election of a member of the provincial legislature to the National Council 
of Provinces, his place in the legislature expires (art. 62 sec. 2). As for Belgium, com-
bination of seats only applies to senators elected by the Councils of the language 
communities.
In this way the Bundesrat is formed by the members of the executives of the 
Länder, while in Belgium some of the members of the Senate are at the same time 
members of the parliaments of the language communities. The Russian Council of 
the Federation and National Council of Provinces, on the other hand, is made up of 
both members of the executive and legislative authorities of the constituent parts, in 
the former case proportionally (one member from each authority), and in the latter 
with a clear advantage to the legislative factor, since three out of the four permanent 
delegates are elected from the members of the provincial legislature and only the pre-
mier is a member of the provincial executive.
Combination of positions in the government of the constituent parts with a sena-
torial seat is constitutionally inadmissible only in a few federations. A clear prohibi-
tion of combination of a parliamentary seat with any public office or elected position 
is given by the constitution of Brazil (art. 54 IId). The constitution of Austria bans 
members of the Federal Council from being members of a state parliament, but only 
42 In practice seats are vacated relatively frequently. Between November 1977 and September 2007 
the state authorities had to fill vacant seats some 61 times, i.e. an average of over two occasions per 
year. On 48 occasions the state parliaments made the choice, the governor appointed 12 senators, 
and in one case the seat was not filled.
43 Art. 56 II § 1. Even in cases where there is no replacement, the state authorities are not entitled to 
fill the vacant seat. In this situation the constitution foresees by-elections, but only when more than 
15 months remain to the end of the terms of office (§ 2).
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that which elects them (art. 35 sec. 2), while there is nothing to stop them from be-
ing members of another state parliament.44
In total, only in six federations does the constitution refer to this issue. Where 
there is no appropriate constitutional regulation, introducing any prohibitions in the 
scope of combination of functions depends on the way in which the second chamber 
is composed. In cases where members are elected by the parliaments of the federal 
entities, it is they who rule on this issue. In those states where the composition of 
the second chamber is decided by direct elections or the nominations of the federal 
authorities, it is these bodies that are responsible for introducing any prohibitions on 
combination of functions. In this way in Australia a ban on members of a state par-
liament taking up a senatorial seat is provided by federal regulations on the holding 
of elections (Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, art. 164). In Switzerland, mean-
while, establishment of regulations in the combination of a seat in the Council of 
States with a function in regional government is part of canton law. Regulations for-
bidding this kind of practice are in place today in the majority of cantons.45
Particularly in the case of direct elections, a means to ensure at least minimal 
ties between the federal entity and its representative is the requirement of domicile, 
which can assume various, more and less rigorous, forms. It might demand candi-
dates to the second chamber to have been born in the province which they are to 
represent (Argentina), or at least in the neighbouring state (Mexico), or to reside 
there permanently (Brazil, UAE) or only at the time of the election (USA), possibly 
for a length of time stated in the constitution (two years immediately before the elec-
tions in Argentina, six months in Mexico; in the former case this requirement is an 
alternative to birth in the province, while in the latter a candidate must fulfil both 
conditions). The question of domicile is handled differently again in India, where 
article 3 of the Representation of the People Act of 1951 sets out that no one who 
is not a voter in parliamentary elections in a state can represent that state in Rajya 
Sabha.46 The requirement of domicile is present not only in the case of direct elec-
tions.47 In a situation where the federal entities are responsible for deciding the com-
position of the second chamber, this question is settled in their constitutions or acts 
of a lower government.48
It may seem that the most effective way of affiliating a representative with a fed-
eral entity is an imperative mandate, but this is only used in four federal parliaments, 
and in its complete form only in the German Bundesrat. Committing members of 
44 R. Thienel, ‘Austriacki parlament…’, p. 21.
45 A. Huber-Hotz, ‘System dwuizbowy – model i rzeczywistość’ in Parlament Szwajcarii, p. 117.
46 N.B. in practice this regulation is constantly ignored. See A.G. Noorani, Constitutional Questions 
in India. The President, Parliament and the States, Oxford University Press, New Delhi–New York 
2000, pp. 138-139.
47 Canadian senators are required to reside in the province to be represented in the Senate.
48 The solutions employed in Austria are typical. The federal constitution requires that members of 
the Council have the right of election to the Land parliament, conditions for which are determined 
by Land law.
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the Bundesrat to binding instructions does not result directly from any regulation of 
the Basic Law, but this kind of mandate is indirectly suggested above all by the pos-
sibility of appeal of members through Länder governments and by the requirement 
of universal voting by Länder delegations, but also by other constitutional regula-
tions.49 Binding instructions and recommendations are made to the members of the 
Bundesrat by the government,50 but we should note that in constitutional practice 
the principle of the binding mandate has been considerably toned down. It is im-
portant to remember that the Basic Law does not insist that instructions be given, 
while in political practice heads of government also have a certain freedom in terms 
of ignoring instructions, if the requirements of the changing political situation dic-
tate such behaviour.51
Similar mechanisms, which are in fact based on the German regulations, are 
envisaged by the constitution of South Africa. Each provincial delegation in the 
National Council of Provinces has one vote, cast in its name by the premier, al-
though this method of voting only takes place in cases concerning the provinces. In 
all other issues, which, notably, are far fewer in number, the members of the Council 
vote individually. It is characteristic that, in accordance with the constitution, in-
dividual voting of members of delegations is the exception. The rule is voting by 
province, as envisaged by art. 65 sec. 1a of the constitution. When votes are given by 
the provinces, the voting method is designated by the instructions of the provincial 
legislatures.52 The constitution of South Africa also permits permanent delegates of 
the National Council of Provinces to be dismissed, although this right is not held by 
the provincial legislature, but by the party which nominated the delegate in question 
(art. 62 sec. 4c & d).
Elements of the imperative mandate also appear in the Russian Council of the 
Federation and in the Nigerian Senate, in the form of the possibility of dismissing 
a representative during his term of office. In Russia, the decision is taken by the au-
49 As Piotr Czarny writes, “In general we can state that the construction of the imperative mandate 
results from historical interpretation and from the entirety of legal-positive solutions, and not from 
one specific regulation of the Basic Law.” P. Czarny, Bundesrat…, p. 61.
50 B. Banaszak, ‘Introduction’ in Konstytucja Niemiec, Warszawa 2008, p. 24.
51 P. Czarny, Bundesrat…, p. 63.
52 The instructions of provincial legislatures as a method of determining the voting of delegations are 
sanctioned by art. 65 sec. 2 of the constitution, which also foresees uniform regulation of this ques-
tion in federal law. Given the lack of such a law, in terms of instructions various practices have de-
veloped in the various provinces. It is common for instructions to be given individually for specific 
draft legislation, which is handled by the National Council of Provinces. Some legislatures give the 
members of the delegations a certain freedom when it comes to deciding on the manner of voting, 
while others forbid any deviation from the authorisation contained in instruction without prior 
consultation with the legislature of the province. In fact, the legislatures of the provinces decide 
on the way in which the delegation votes in all matters concerning the province. See C. Murray, 
‘Designing Parliament for Cooperative Federalism: South Africa’s National Council of Provinces’ in 
F.L. Seidle, D.C. Docherty (eds.), Reforming Parliamentary Democracy, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, Montreal–Ithaca 2003, note 10, p. 219.
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thorities of the federal entities responsible for nominating particular members,53 while 
in Nigeria dismissal takes place as the result of a referendum called by the electoral 
committee following the submission to it of an official petition expressing a vote of no 
confidence in the representative from the voters of his district, signed by no fewer than 
half of the people registered to vote in that district (art. 69 of the federal constitution). 
It is worth noting, though, that members of the first chamber of parliament can also 
be dismissed by a similar procedure, meaning that “recall” in Nigeria does not have en-
tirely federalist overtones. This is all the more the case as for the purposes of the elec-
tion of senators states are divided into three electoral districts, and the right to dismiss 
representatives is only held by voters from the district, not those of the whole state.
A number of federal constitutions, on the other hand, feature a clear prohibition 
on imperative mandate. As examples we can cite Austria (art. 56 sec. 1), Switzerland 
(art. 161) and the Comoros Federation (art. 22).
As mentioned earlier, second chambers of federal parliaments realise a different 
model of representation depending on the formula of their composition. None the 
less, particularly characteristic is the fact that in most cases federal constitutions, 
irrespective of the method of composition of the second chamber, point to the 
constituent parts of the federation as entities represented in the second chamber. 
Art. 34 sec. 1 of the constitution of Austria asserts simply that the Länder are repre-
sented in the Federal Council, while according to art. 80 sec. 1b of the constitution 
of India the Rajya Sabha is made up, apart from people nominated by the president, 
of “representatives of the states and territories of the Union,” and in Canada art. 22 
of the Constitutional Act of 1867 refers to the representation of the provinces in 
the Senate. Similar formulations are in use in the constitutions of South Africa (“the 
National Council of Provinces represents the provinces,” art. 42 sec. 4), Switzerland 
(“the Council of the Cantons consists of 46 deputies of cantons,” art. 150 sec. 1). 
Brazil (“the Federal Senate consists of representatives of the states and the Federal 
District”, art. 46) and Australia (“the Senate will consist of senators from every 
state,” art. 7).
The German Basic Law does not designate Länder as subjects of representation, 
but rather states that through the Bundesrat they work together in the legislation and 
administration of the Federation as well as in European Union matters. However, 
although “from a legal point of view, taking into account the composition of the 
Bundesrat and way in which it is formed, it is incorrect to describe it as a chamber of 
lands of the union,” “for the whole body of work of the Bundesrat this description is 
better than any other which might be used.”54 The fact that these Länder are the sub-
53 In 2001-2004 the authorities of the federal entities could easily dismiss their representatives, some-
thing which they did relatively often. As of December 2004, the dismissal procedure has to be ini-
tiated by the chair of the Council of the Federation. This new regulation weakens the control on 
the members of the Council from the bodies electing them. Since the change no deputies to the 
Council of the Federation have been dismissed.
54 R. Herzog, ‘Pozycja Bundesratu w demokratycznym państwie federalnym’ in J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof 
(eds.), Parlament Republiki Federalnej Niemiec, trans. by B. Banaszak, Warszawa 1995, p. 186.
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ject of representation in the Bundesrat is also suggested by the way of voting in the 
Council envisaged by the Basic Law. Uniform voting expresses the “will” of the Land, 
which must be one, not various.55 As mentioned above, uniform voting is also the 
basic method employed in the National Council of Provinces in South Africa. While 
in Germany the Länder have varying numbers of votes, though, in South Africa each 
province has just one.
In other constitutions which do not stress the federation as being the entity 
represented in the second chamber, a completely different meaning of represen-
tation in the two chambers can be noticed. This can be seen particularly clearly 
in the constitution of Mexico, which only describes members of the Chamber of 
Deputies as representatives of the Nation (representantes de la Nación, art. 51).56 
The words of the American constitution, on the other hand, are not so clear, al-
though when we take into account historical circumstances and the fact that ini-
tially it was the senators that elected the state legislature, we can assert without 
great risk that the Senate was to be the representation of the States as territorial 
communities, and the connection of representation of states and election of sena-
tors by the state legislature designated the senators as “ambassadors” of the states 
in Congress.57 The historical evolution of the Senate, which we will discuss later, 
crowned by the introduction of direct elections of senators, to a significant degree 
changed the perception of the Senate. Similar remarks can be made in reference 
to the Senate of Argentina, whose members have been elected in general elections 
only since 2001.
A constitutional declaration naming a state, land or province as a collective en-
tity represented in the second chamber is consolidated by the fact that, for the pur-
poses of an election of deputies the constituent parts are not divided into electoral 
districts. In this way elected members of parliament represent the whole constituent 
unit of the federation, and not only part of it. Out of the seven federations in which 
the second chambers are constituted by general and direct elections, only in Nigeria 
does the constitution divide states into three electoral districts for the purposes of 
election of senators (art. 71 a). In other countries the requirement of election of all 
representatives of the state, province etc. by the sum of the people is formulated ex-
pressis verbis in the federal constitution (art. 54 of the constitution of Argentina, 
art. 7 of that of Australia) or results from one of the articles in an unambiguous way 
55 Cf. E. Zwierzchowski, ‘Rada Federalna Republiki Federalnej Niemiec’ in E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), 
Izby drugie…, pp. 183-184.
56 It is impossible to agree with J. Czajowski, according to whom art. 51 means that “the deputies and 
senators are representatives of the people” (J. Czajowski, Kongres Generalny Meksykańskich Stanów 
Zjednoczonych, Warszawa 2002, p. 33). Firstly, art. 51, typically, does not contain mention of sena-
tors, and secondly deputies are described in it as “representatives of the Nation”, not “the people”. 
As the constitution uses both terms, they can not be used interchangeably.
57 R.A. Baker, The Senate of the United States. A Bicentennial History, Robert E. Krieger Publishing 
Company, Malabar 1988, p. 8. Similar: B. Sinclair, ‘Coequal Partner: The U.S. Senate’ in 
S.C. Patterson, A. Mughan (ed.), Senates…, p. 34.
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(Brazil, Mexico, USA).58 In the case of Switzerland decision in this question, as in 
a number of others connected to the composition of the Council of States, rests with 
canton law. At present all cantons form an electoral district for the purposes of elec-
tion of councillors.
If uniform voting is an argument for the thesis that the constituent units are the 
entities represented in the second chamber, and emphasises the connection between 
representatives and the federal entity, then the constitutional prohibition on indi-
vidual voting clearly shows a desire to weaken this link, and thereby also the role 
of the second chamber as a representation of the interests of the constituent units. 
A regulation appears in the American constitution, and one modelled on it in that 
of Argentina, which clearly endows each senator with one vote, and this was meant 
to weaken the construction whereby they might present the uniform representative 
view of the state.59
Of course, in the vast majority of federal parliaments representatives of federated 
units vote individually. None the less, as a rule this is not emphasised as decidedly as 
in the American and Argentinian constitutions. Although there is no qualitative dif-
ference, then, the principle is underscored that representation in the Senates of these 
countries is individual in character, and that there is no room for expression of the 
uniform “will” of the entities of the federation.
An important question is whether designating of the constituent units as the en-
tity represented in the second chamber bears any practical consequences. Although 
this type of representation is traditionally seen as one of the elements of the broad 
perception of an imperative mandate,60 in most of the states discussed here it does 
not have any consequences, but remains in the scope of constitutional declarations.61 
This is the case above all because this declaration is not accompanied by mecha-
58 Since the constitutions of these countries state that senators represent states, and furthermore 
are elected by their inhabitants, there can be no doubt that, although the terms of the constitu-
tion do not clearly establish this, the representatives of states have the right to vote for all sena-
tors representing them in the federal legislature. Cf. J. Czajowski, Kongres Generalny…, p. 20; 
Z. Kiełmiński, Kongres Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, Warszawa 1994, p. 11; J. Spyra, Kongres 
Narodowy Federacyjnej Republiki Brazylii, Warszawa 1999, p. 15.
59 J. Jaskiernia, ‘Funkcje dwuizbowości Kongresu w systemie ustrojowym USA’, Państwo i Prawo, 
Issue 3 (1991), p. 59.
60 J. Karp states that the very formulation of art. 86 of the 1992 constitution of the Federation of 
Yugoslavia, designating members of the second chamber as representatives of the republic in which 
they were elected, allows their mandate to be described as particularistic, as opposed to the universal 
mandate of the members of the first chamber, who were to represent the whole Yugoslav nation. See 
J. Karp, ‘Parlamentaryzm byłej Jugosławii oraz Serbii i Czarnogóry’ in J. Czajowski, M. Grzybowski 
(eds.), Parlamenty…, p. 195.
61 Characteristic here is the position of the Swiss doctrine, established on the basis of the previ-
ous basic law, which unequivocally stated that in spite of the various descriptions f the constitu-
tion “the relationship with representation in the two chambers does not differ. Both chambers 
are federal bodies, and, despite the different ways they are formed, represent the general inter-
ests of the whole country.” Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, ‘Rada Kantonów Konfederacji Szwajcarskiej’ in 
E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie…, p. 244.
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nisms which are able to make it reality. However, as Paweł Sarnecki rightly notes in 
his analysis of the case of the Austrian Federal Council, if the federal constitution 
“states clearly that Länder are represented in the Federal Council… it would be en-
tirely understandable to equip the Land parliaments, and therefore the factor that 
elects ‘federal councils,’ with the right also to determine their approach, meaning an 
appropriate understanding of the Länder’s interests in the forum of the Council.”62 
Similar remarks might be made in reference to other second chambers, especially 
those whose members are elected by the authorities of the entities of the federation, 
and also those which are constituted by means of general elections. If the constitu-
tion indicates that the entity represented in the second chamber is a state, province or 
land this type of declaration should lead to appropriate consequences. This is because 
it indicates that the representative mandate of members of the second chambers is 
different from that of members of parliament entering the first chambers. They are 
not elected to represent the interests of the voters or citizens, but only those of some 
of them, i.e. those residing in the same constituent part of the federation as them. 
In this way, senators designated by the various states or provinces who begin activi-
ties in the parliamentary forum or voting in a particular way should bear in mind 
the interests of the federal entities that they represent. While the role of the second 
chamber in a federal state is to represent the interests of the constituent units, in 
a federal parliament the problem of who is entitled to decide what the interests are 
becomes a key issue. It would seem natural for this to be the authorities of the states, 
provinces or cantons. Their functions cannot, after all, be reduced entirely to the 
internal sphere of the federated units, but must also encompass the external dimen-
sion. In other words, the authorities of the entities of the federation are elected also 
to represent their citizens in respect to the federal authorities. In this way the prin-
ciple of double representation can be realised in the most appropriate manner. The 
point of a separate representation for the constituent parts in the federal parliament 
is not only to defend the principle of federalism itself,63 but to ensure joint participa-
tion in the construction of the decisions of the federal authorities, and participation 
of the distinct territorial communities in expressing the will of the state federation. 
It is for this reason that it appears that in a federal bicameral system a natural model 
of parliamentary mandate in the second chamber is imperative mandate. As Meg 
Russell points out, institutional connection of members of second chambers with 
the authorities of the constituent parts of the federation would bring with it the ad-
ditional advantage of enabling correlation of policies conducted on the two levels of 
government.64
62 P. Sarnecki, ‘Rada Federalna Republiki Austrii’ in E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie…, pp. 72-73.
63 It is impossible, then, to fully share the view of J. Szymanek, according to whom federal bi-
cameralism “has a clearly defined sense in the form of representation of the constituent parts 
of a unified country, and therefore of defence of the very principle of federalism.” J. Szymanek, 
‘Dwuizbowość parlamentu w europejskich systemach politycznych’, Studia Prawnicze, Issues 3-4 
(2000), p. 60.
64 M. Russell, ‘The Territorial…’, p. 112.
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The formation of a second chamber of federal parliament via general elections by 
breaking the institutional connection between the authorities of the federal entities 
and their representatives in the federal legislature causes two competing centres of rep-
resentation of these entities to arise. At the same time a situation arises whereby the 
authorities of the federal entities expressing their will to represent the interests of those 
entities to the federal authorities do not dispose of appropriate constitutional means, 
while members of the second chambers, who are suitably secured constitutionally, are 
not effective mouthpieces of these interests, especially because their activities in parlia-
ment are stimulated above all by party affiliation, and not territorial affiliation.
From this point of view, the most desirable (i.e. in accordance with the reso-
lutions of the federal system) means of creation of the composition of the second 
chamber of a federal parliament is the election of its members by the authorities of 
the federal entities, and possibly, like in Switzerland, leaving it up to them to de-
cide on the composition of the second chamber of its representatives. In this kind 
of situation there is no hint of competition in terms of representation of cantons to 
the federation, since the canton authorities voluntarily withdraw from fulfilling this 
function, while at the same time having the chance of a stronger connection of the 
representatives of the canton with its governmental bodies if they decide that they 
insufficiently represent canton interests in the Council.
The relationship of the representation of the entities of the federation and its au-
thorities through the process of composition of the second chamber is not sufficient 
condition, but it is vital for a real representation of the interests of the constituent 
parts in the federal parliament. Direct elections, as shown by the experiences of those 
federations which constitute the second chamber in this way, almost always result in 
the domination of party divides, in this way weakening the character of the second 
chamber as a “federal” chamber in which the interest of the constituent units are 
supposed to be represented. In some cases, incidentally, this is the intention of the 
introduction of direct elections, such as in Brazil, where they were supposed to be 
a way to reduce the power of the state governors and weaken their influence on the 
federal authorities.
A consequence of direct elections is to break the institutional link between the 
federal entity and its representatives in the federal parliament. Elections, however, 
suit the activeness of political parties. In this way, in second chambers formed thus, 
divisions occur much more often on party lines than owing to geographical borders. 
Significant here is an opinion expressed by an Australian historian, just 12 years 
after the founding of the Australian federation commenting on the practical func-
tioning of the Senate: “There never was before, and, we expect, never will be [in 
parliament] a division in opinions by state borders; and the establishment of the 
Senate as a defence of state interests appears now (…) to be an unnecessary means 
of caution.”65
65 B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900. A Stage in the Growth of the 
Empire, Longmans, Green and Co., London–New York–Bombay–Calcutta 1913, p. 248.
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The election of members of second chambers by the governments of the con-
stituent units is not in itself, though, a sufficient guarantee that they will in reality 
represent their interests in the federal legislature. For this to be the case, the link 
must have a significantly deeper character, and its most important facet must be 
connection to the representative by an imperative mandate. Even when members 
of the second chamber are elected by the parliaments of the federal entities, there is 
no guarantee that representatives chosen in this way will realise the interests of the 
constituent parts, if they are not bound by instructions and if the bodies appointing 
them do not have appropriate sanctions with which they can force them to follow 
these instructions.
The history of the American Senate can be instructive in this field. As mentioned 
earlier, as a result of the equal representation of the states and the appointment of 
senators by the state legislatures, it was perceived as an instrument of influence of 
the states on the federal authorities, and the senators were expected to act as a kind 
of ambassador of their state in Congress. Right up to 1913, when an amendment to 
the constitution introduced direct election of senators, the legislatures making their 
appointment at the same time passed an instruction that contained a traditional for-
mula obliging the senator to vote in an appropriate way in the Senate (“Be it resolved 
that our Senators in Congress are hereby instructed…”). However, as a result of the 
lack of sanction to ensure adherence to these instructions, with time very few sena-
tors took them into account at all. The only sanctions the legislatures had at their 
disposal were to refrain from re-election or force the resignation of the senator in 
question, but the effectiveness of these methods was very much limited.66 Efforts at 
the 1st and 8th Congress to introduce to the federal constitution the institution of 
recall of senators proved fruitless. In addition, the emancipation of senators from the 
influences of state legislatures also led to changes in the way they were elected. From 
the 1930s, candidates for senator began to run a rudimentary election campaign, 
which would precede the formal decision of the legislature, serving to show which 
candidates had the greatest support among the inhabitants of the state. With time, 
state legislatures began to respect the results of pre-elections or electoral conventions, 
as a result of which their influence on the choice of senators became illusory. The 
culmination of this process was the introduction of the 17th Amendment, direct elec-
tion of senators in all states.
These two factors, i.e. the free mandate of senators and the removal of the right 
to their election for state legislatures, meant that the Senate did not become a tool 
by which the states could control the decisions of the federal authorities. Senators, 
liberated relatively early on from the influence of state legislatures, were themselves 
66 The term of office of senators was significantly shorter than that of the state legislatures, thus 
guaranteeing them greater independence. Resignation, meanwhile, was honourable conduct, and 
became rarer as the prestige of the Senate grew. It was often recorded in the first half of the 19th 
century, the last occasion being in 1846. See W.H. Riker, ‘The Senate and American Federalism’ 
in S.C. Patterson (ed.), American Legislative Behaviour, D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., Princeton 
1968, pp. 30-35.
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responsible for defining their role as members of Congress,67 and the Senate itself did 
not become a “chamber of states,” but with time became to a greater degree a federal 
entity than the House of Representatives.
Criticism of second chambers in federal states is very often connected to a lack 
of ability to effectively represent the interests of the entities of the federation. 
This results especially from the way in which they are constituted, which does not 
provide the members of second chambers with an appropriate legitimacy to rep-
resent the states or provinces, or causes domination of second chambers by party-
political divisions. The first argument is illustrated by the examples of Canada and 
Malaysia, in which all (Canada) or the majority of members of the second cham-
bers are appointed by the federal authorities. As a result, in these countries even 
the composition of the second chambers effectively prevents the members from 
fulfilling their function of representing the provinces and states adequately.68 It is 
characteristic that in the case of Malaysia the number of members of the Dewan 
Negara stemming from appointment grew, meaning that the federal premier, who 
in fact decided on these nominations, obtained an ever greater influence in the 
second chamber.69
The domination of party divides is the rule in places where the second cham-
ber is elected by general elections70. The role of political parties is shown clearly by 
the system for electing of senators in Argentina and Mexico. In the former case, 
a semi-proportional system operates in elections to the Senate, i.e. voters vote for 
a party list, while the party or coalition that receives the highest number of votes 
receives two seats, and that which receives the second highest number receives the 
third (art. 5471). In Mexico two senators are elected by a simple majority system, and 
one seat in each state goes to the party whose candidates come second in terms of 
number of votes (art. 56).
Similar phenomena can also be seen, though, in those countries where election 
of members of chambers is carried out by the parliaments of the constituent ele-
67 Cf. B. Sinclair, ‘Coequal Partner…’, pp. 34-35.
68 See e.g. D. Roblin, ‘The Case for an Elected Senate’, Canadian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 5, 
No. 3 (1982), p. 8; A. Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia, Kluwer Law 
International, Hague–London–Boston 1996, p. 96.
69 D.A. Johnson, A. Milner, ‘Westminster Implanted: The Malaysian Experience’ in H. Patapan, 
J. Wanna, P. Weller (eds.), Westminster Legacies. Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and 
the Pacific, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney 2005, p. 93.
70 In making such a general conclusion, we must declare two reservations. Owing to the peculiari-
ties of the organisation of American and Swiss political parties, the individual members of the US 
Senate enjoy much independence and party discipline is very much restricted, while the members 
of the Council of States are much more closely bound to their canton than the whole federation, as 
a result of the high degree of independence of canton party organisations.
71 See P. Uziębło, ‘Wybrane zagadnienia prawa wyborczego Ameryki Południowej (po przemianach 
demokratycznych końca XX i początku XXI wieku i ich wpływ na system rządów)’ in T. Mołdawa, 
J. Szymanek (eds.), Systemy rządów. Dylematy konstytucyjnej regulacji i praktycznej funkcjonalności, 
Warszawa 2007, pp. 164-165.
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ments. The standard examples of federations in which this is the case are Austria, 
South Africa and India. In the first case, the requirement in the federal constitution 
that at least one seat be given to the second largest party in the national parliament 
even suggests a decisive role for political parties in the appointment of members in 
the Federal Council.72
The participation of political parties in filling senatorial seats is also handled 
by the regulations on the means of filling vacant seats in the Australian Senate. 
Although, as has been shown, competence in this field belongs to the state authori-
ties, according to art. 15 of the constitution, they must if possible appoint to the 
Senate a person from the same party as that of the senator vacating the seat. It is 
characteristic that the original regulation, which provided state legislatures with 
complete freedom in this field, was changed in 1977, after the traditional conven-
tion, which in spite of a lack of legal requirements dictated that vacant seats be 
filled with people from the same party, was broken several times by some of the 
state parliaments.73
The cases cited here, as well as the role mentioned earlier of the parties in the 
composition of the National Council of Provinces in South Africa, demonstrate 
the constitutionally required participation of parties in the creation of second par-
liamentary chambers in federal states. In other federations, the leading role of po-
litical parties in the process of composition of second chambers is stimulated above 
all by general elections, which create a particularly favourable environment for ac-
tivity of political parties. The domination of political parties does, however, cause 
the political resolutions of second chambers often to mirror the first chamber,74 in 
this way undermining the constitutional legitimacy of bicameralism in the federal 
system.
According to Russell, the domination of second chambers by party interests does 
not necessarily means that the interests of the constituent units cannot also be repre-
sented there. However, this takes place in a different way, not through official parlia-
mentary procedures, but through political channels. She gives the Australian Senate 
as an example of a parliament functioning in this way.75 Looking at the practice of the 
functioning of the Senate in Australia, though, it is hard to share this view. Firstly, it 
is very rare for senators from one state to vote together, in spite of their various party 
affiliations.76 Secondly, as Wilfried Swenden’s research shows, the senators themselves 
72 I. Kathrein, ‘Rada Federalna’ in H. Schambeck (ed.), Parlament Republiki Austrii, trans. by 
B. Banaszak, Warszawa 1997, p. 105.
73 See J. Uhr, ‘Explicating the Australian Senate’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2002), 
p. 18.
74 Cf. J. Szymanek, Dwuizbowość…, p. 38.
75 M. Russell, ‘What are Second Chambers for?’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2001), 
p. 445.
76 J. Uhr, ‘The Canadian and Australian Senates: Comparing Federal Political Institutions’ in 
B.W. Hodgins et al. (eds.), Federalism in Canada & Australia. Historical Perspectives 1920-1988, 
Trent University Frost Centre, Peterborough 1989, p. 141.
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do not consider representing the interests of their state as the most important task, 
or even as one of the most important, and do not perceive the Senate as an institu-
tion meant to particularly serve to articulate or defend these interests.77 Thirdly, as 
a result of its highly centralised selection procedure, the Senate is paradoxically the 
more partisan of the parliamentary chambers. Candidates for senator are more often 
recruited from party activists at federal level, meaning that they represent an even 
more national perspective than the members of the House of Representatives.78
While the example of the Australian Senate might not be an apt one, then Russell’s 
thesis can at least be defended by reference to the practice of Switzerland, where the 
Council of States, though elected by general elections, is considered an effective rep-
resentative of the interests of the cantons. Suffice to say that in discussions on whole-
sale changes to the constitution of Switzerland, the Working Group for Preparation 
of a Complete Change to the Constitution rejected postulates on greater institution-
alisation of the links of the cantons to the parliament as a federal body, e.g. by way of 
appointment to the Council of the Cantons of members of the canton governments 
or parliaments, stating that “sufficient for the creation of appropriate links between 
the cantons are the customs in place outside legal norms as well as the means which 
the cantons have hitherto had at their disposal.”79 The case of Switzerland is a special 
one, though, and it is worth remembering that in this case the case the cantons have 
sufficient means to, if necessary, radically strengthen the institutional bonds joining 
them with their representatives in the Council of States.
As mentioned earlier, it would be optimal from the point of view of federal rep-
resentation for members of second chambers to be elected by the governing bodies 
of the federal entities with acceptance of the model of representation in the form of 
an imperative mandate. This kind of solution would ensure an appropriately strong 
connection between the entity represented (federated unit) and its representative. An 
argument raised against parliamentary chambers appointed in another way than by 
general elections, however, is their supposed lack of sufficient democratic legitima-
tion, which can only be provided by general, free elections. It is characteristic that 
in the first draft of the Australian federal constitution from 1891 competences in 
appointing senators were entrusted to the state legislatures. This idea was rejected, 
though, in the second draft, owing to fears that a Senate appointed in this way would 
not have a sufficiently strong legitimation to fall back on as would the states, with 
their huge powers.80
77 W. Swenden, Federalism and Second Chambers. Regional Representation in Parliamentary Federations: 
the Australian Senate and German Bundesrat Compared, P. I. E.-Peter Lang, Brussels 2004, pp. 205, 
209.
78 For more information see P. van Onselen, ‘Pre-Parliamentary Backgrounds of Australian Major Party 
MPs: Effects on Representation’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2004), pp. 90-97.
79 ‘Schlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe für die Vorbereitung einer Totalrevision der Bundesverfassung’, 
1973, Vol. 4, p. 475 quoted in A. Huber-Hotz, ‘System dwuizbowy…’, p. 117.
80 See J. Warden, ‘Federalism and the Design of the Australian Constitution’, Federalism Research 
Centre Discussion Papers, No. 19 (1992), p. 12.
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Similar arguments can be heard in the debate going on today on reform of the 
Canadian Senate.81 It is worth noting, though, that the problem of democratic legiti-
mation of second chambers in federal states must be looked at somewhat differently. 
Of course, if the members of second chambers are appointed by governing bodies of 
the federal entities, their democratic legitimacy will only be indirect. Does this mean, 
though, that it will be too weak or insufficient? Federations are composed of two kinds 
of community: national, and of separate territorial communities. The latter elect their 
governing bodies, equipping them with the appropriate democratic legitimacy (it is 
often the federal constitutions that guarantee the democratic character of the systems 
of the federal entities), and entrusting them in this way to represent them both in the 
internal and external spheres, also against the federal authorities. The connection of 
the representatives of the entities of the federation in the federal parliament with the 
governing bodies of these entities is the best form of confirmation of their legitimacy, 
as these bodies are appointed by the citizens of the federated units.
Even if we state that from the point of view of democracy it will be better if the 
body that appoints representatives and to which they are responsible is the legisla-
ture, still the accusations levelled at the German Bundesrat of lack of sufficient dem-
ocratic legitimacy are not justified. Ultimately the members of the Länder govern-
ments entering the Bundesrat are politically accountable to their state parliaments, 
which are after all elected by democratic elections.82
Furthermore, the experiences of federal states show that in those countries where 
the second chamber does not ensure effective representation of interests of the con-
stituent units in the federal legislature, informal institutions are established for this 
purpose, which do not have a constitutional basis from what, from the point of view 
of a democratic political system, causing considerably more doubts than a second 
chamber not elected by general elections. In Canada, where the Senate is entirely 
marginalised, the institution representing the interests of the provinces towards the 
federal authorities has become the regular meetings of the federal premier with the 
premiers of the provinces, functioning under the name of Conference of the Heads 
of Governments. A similar institution has been formed in Austria, the Conference 
of Leaders of the Federal Länder, which is also informal and not based in constitu-
tional law. “In it participate people at the head of the Länder, generally the leaders of 
the relevant national party organisations. The Conference is of great political signifi-
cance, and its participants are influential people. For this reason too it represents the 
interests of the Länder with respect to the federation and participates, in an informal 
manner, in the legislative process, as it is in this forum, and not at the Council of the 
81 See T. Kent, ‘An Elected Senate: Key to Redressing the Democratic Deficit, Revitalizing Federalism’, 
Policy Options, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), p. 50.
82 Cf. W.J. Patzelt, ‘The Very Federal House: The German Bundesrat’ in S.C. Patterson, A. Mughan 
(eds.), Senates…, pp. 70-71. Although Herzog writes about the “insufficiency of democratic legi-
macy” of the Bundesrat, he also stresses that the regulations of the Basic Law on e.g. the state 
of absolute legislative necessity causes the “Basic Law to assess the democratic legitimacy of the 
Bundesrat remarkably highly”. R. Herzog, ‘Pozycja Bundesratu…’, pp. 195-196.
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Federation that the more important draft legislation is discussed.”83 In this way the 
real decision centre is moved out from the constitutional bodies of the state, which 
cannot be considered to be a desirable or correct state of affairs, especially from the 
point of view of democratic control, but also that of the rule of law.
The desire to equip the second chamber with the greatest democratic legitimacy 
possible can therefore lead to a situation whereby, as a result of the establishment of 
extra-constitutional government institutions, the democratic legitimacy of the whole 
political system of the state is weakened.
* * *
The variety of the solutions of political system visible in federal states in terms of re-
presentation of the constituent units in federal parliaments does not permit a simple 
classification to be constructed. Certainly, second chambers in contemporary federal 
states are not easy to classify and describe in terms of traditional, very simplified, mo-
dels of Senate and Council. The diversification between them is so large – especially 
if we take into account more detailed regulations, rather than just general ones – that 
without great risk we can state that no two federal state parliaments have the same 
formulas of representation for the constituent units.
Of particular interest are the attempts in two federations to ensure separate rep-
resentation of the constituent parts within a unicameral parliament. Although such 
solutions are few and far between, and characteristic of countries which are small and 
have a relatively short constitutional history, they force us to revise our traditional 
view that bicameralism is a prerequisite of federal systems.
The question of whether a second chamber of parliament will be an effective rep-
resentative of the interests of the constituent parts of the federal state is decided not 
only be the formula of representation assumed, but also by the competences with 
which it is equipped. In general, second chambers of federal parliaments are among 
the most powerful in comparison with their counterparts in unitary states84. This is-
sue requires a separate, detailed study, however.
It is a characteristic of many federations that the effectiveness of their second cham-
bers as representatives of federated units is assessed as very low. On the one hand, this 
situation might suggest centralising tendencies appearing in a concrete federal system. 
On the other hand, though, a diminishing significance of parliamentary representa-
tion of the constituent parts might be perceived as one of the factors generating and 
supporting these tendencies. Ultimately, between the factors of social nature and sys-
temic institutions mutual relations develop, and not only one-sided ones.
Translated by Ben Koschalka
83 R. Thienel, ‘Austriacki parlament…’, p. 22.
84 Cf. S.C. Patterson, A. Mughan, ‘Fundamentals of Institutional Design: The Functions and Powers 
of Parliamentary Second Chambers’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), p. 45.
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